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1 Introduction
On average, economic growth reduces poverty, and there is a voluminous body
of empirical research to support this statement. However, the dispersion around
the average is large: the elasticity of poverty with respect to economic growth
varies considerably across countries and over time. The challenge for develop-
ment economists and policymakers is to understand to what extent economic
policies contribute to making growth more or less pro-poor.1 This paper takes
up the challenge from a macroeconometric perspective: using a relatively large
sample of countries, a system of three endogenous equations is estimated in order
to disentangle the diﬀerent channels through which economic policy variables
aﬀect poverty dynamics. The speciﬁc policy variables that are investigated are
meant to capture some of the key dimensions of the economic policy space of
1For the purpose of this paper, saying that growth is more or less pro-poor is equivalent to
saying that poverty is more or less responsive to economic growth. Responsiveness is in turn
associated with a notion of elasticity. Letting ∆y and ∆p denote the percentage change in
per-capita income and poverty headcount respectively, the marginal eﬀect of ∆y on ∆p gives
a measure of the responsiveness of poverty to growth.
1developing countries: openness to international trade, macroeconomic stability,
depth of ﬁnancial intermediation, size of government, and education.
There is a fast growing literature on the relationship between growth and
poverty. Evidence of a signiﬁcant poverty-reducing eﬀect of economic growth
goes back to Fields (1989) and Squire (1993), who estimate income elasticities
of poverty reduction well in excess of two. Similar ﬁndings have been reported
by Bruno et al. (1998) and Adams (2004). In a seminal paper, Dollar and
Kraay (2002) show that the elasticity of mean income of the poor with respect
to average mean income is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, meaning that
growth is unambiguously good for the poor. Kraay (2006) provides additional
evidence that most of the cross-country variation in poverty changes is due to
the variation in the rate of average incomes growth. Ravaillon (1997, 2001 and
2004), Bourguignon (2003), Epualard (2003), Kawkani et al. (2004), Mosley
et al. (2004), Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) stress that the growth elasticity of
poverty signiﬁcantly diﬀer across countries and that these diﬀerences are largely
explained by the interaction between growth and income inequality. In a recent
contribution, Loyaza and Raddatz (2009) take a complementary perspective
and show that the sectoral composition of growth aﬀects its capacity to reduce
poverty.
This paper extends the existing literature by exploring the role of economic
policies in shaping the growth-inequality-poverty relationship. The theoretical
prior of the paper is that economic policies can aﬀect poverty in three separate
ways: (i) by determining the rate of economic growth, (ii) by determining the
dynamics of income inequality, and (iii) by determining the responsiveness of
poverty to growth for any given rate of growth and change in inequality. These
three channels are jointly estimated by using a system of three endogenous equa-
tions. The paper is therefore related to the work of Lundberg and Squire (2003)
and Huang et al. (2009) on the simultaneous evolution of growth and inequality,
although the addition of a poverty equation represents a signiﬁcant innovation
relative to previous studies. The use of a system of equations also makes the
paper quite diﬀerent from the analysis of Chhibber and Nayyar (2008), who go
about exploring the impact of economic variables on the growth elasticity of
poverty within a single equation framework.
The key ﬁndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, growth
and redistribution reduce poverty. However, the growth elasticity of poverty
is not aﬀected by changes in income inequality. Second, there is no trade-oﬀ
between growth and redistribution. In fact, the two processes seem to reinforce
each other. Third, there is strong evidence of a feedback eﬀect of poverty on
both growth and inequality: an increase in the poverty headcount causes both
a slowdown in growth and an increase in inequality. Fourth, economic policies
determine poverty dynamics through multiple channels. Financial development
and bigger government size contribute to poverty reduction via a positive eﬀect
on growth. This contribution is however oﬀset, at least to some extent, by a con-
temporaneous inequality-increasing eﬀect. Furthermore, ﬁnancial development
also appears to reduce the responsiveness of poverty to growth. Macroeconomic
stabilization (here represented by a lower rate of inﬂation) promotes poverty re-
2duction in two ways: by fostering growth and by making poverty more pro-poor.
The role of trade openness and education appears to be limited to their eﬀect on
the responsiveness of poverty to growth. More speciﬁcally, an increase in trade
openness makes poverty less responsive to growth while the opposite is true
for education. Taking stock of these results, one can conclude that countries
tend to move towards one of two possible equilibria. The positive (virtuous)
equilibrium is characterised by faster growth, redistribution, and rapid poverty
reduction. The negative (vicious) equilibrium involves slow (or even negative)
growth, sharpening inequalities, and resilient poverty. The policy mix is then
critical in determining to which of the two equilibria the country will converge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data
and some preliminary stylized facts. Section 3 introduces the econometric model
and the estimation methodology. Results are reported in Section 4. Section 5
discusses the role of growth volatility in explaining why some economic policies
make growth less pro-poor. Section 6 draws some policy conclusions. The
description of the variables and the full list of countries/periods included in the
dataset are provided in the Appendix.
2 Data and stylized facts
The source of poverty data is the PovcalNet Poverty Analysis Tool of the World
Bank (www.http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp). Let the
sequence (tn) denote the years when the data on a poverty indicator p are
available for a generic country i. The dataset used in this paper consists of
observations taken over spells determined from the sequence (tn). Thus, for
country i, the ﬁrst spell starts at t1 and ends at t2; the second spell starts
at t2 and ends at t3; and so forth until all data points are exhausted. The
only additional restriction is that the minimum duration of a spell must be ﬁve
years. In this way it is possible to ﬁlter out short-term dynamics and focus
on long-term eﬀects. In total, after the exclusion of some outliers, 151 spells,
covering 83 countries, are identiﬁed. All the variables, with the exception of a
set of country-ﬁxed eﬀects (see below), are expressed as annualized percentage
changes over each spell. In addition, the dataset includes the initial values of all
variables at the beginning of each spell plus their lagged annualized percentage
change over the ﬁve years prior to the beginning of the spell. Initial and lagged
values turn out to be useful instruments in the estimation process.
The poverty indicator used as a reference is the poverty headcount at 1 dollar
per-day (ph_$1). Income is measured by per-capita GDP at constant prices and
its annualized percentage change is of course the rate of economic growth (y_pc).
Inequality is proxied by the Gini coeﬃcient (gini), so that a negative percentage
change in gini corresponds to redistribution. The policy variables are as follows:
(i) imports plus exports in percent of GDP to measure openness to international
trade (trade), (ii) domestic credit to the private sector in percent of GDP to
proxy for domestic ﬁnancial depth (credit), (iii) the consumer price index (cpi)
to capture macroeconomic stability, (iv) government expenditure in percent of
3GDP (gov) to measure the size of the government, and (v) the average number
of years of schooling in the population (tyr) to proxy for the accumulation of
human capital. Finally, the country-ﬁxed eﬀects are: distance from the equator
(lat_abst), French legal origins (legor_fr), and ethnic fragmentation (ethnic).
As discussed below, these country ﬁxed eﬀects will be used in some equations
to account for the role of institutional quality.
Table 1 reports some key summary statistics for ph_$1, y_pc, and the ratio
of ph_$1 to y_pc. Given that the variables are expressed as annualized percent-
age changes, their ratio can be eﬀectively interpreted as the growth elasticity of
poverty. Two sets of summary statistics are provided: one for the full sample of
151 spells and one for a restricted sample of 71 spells that are associated with
a negative change in the Gini coeﬃcient (that is gini < 0).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The average change in poverty is negative, but signiﬁcantly more so when
the sample is restricted to spells with decreasing inequality. The diﬀerence in
the average value of the growth elasticity of poverty between the full and the
restricted sample is however small. Therefore, redistribution appears to allevi-
ate poverty directly rather than by conditioning the responsiveness of ph_$1 to
growth. The rate of economic growth is on average positive and slightly higher
in the restricted sample, thus suggesting that redistribution and growth are not
necessarily two mutually exclusive processes. The standard deviations of both
ph_$1 and ph_$1/y_pc are quite large. This wide dispersion around the aver-
ages is what motivates the study of the determinants of cross-country variation
in the reposnsiveness of poverty to growth. Another interesting characteristic
of ph_$1 and ph_$1/y_pc is that they occasionally display very large values
(as the maximum and minimum statistics indicate). These large values tend to
occur in association with initially low values of the poverty headcount. In this
sense, there seems to be a mild positive correlation between the initial level of
the poverty indicator and the absolute value of the elasticity. Finally, while the
growth elasticity of poverty is negative on average, in 49 spells out of 151 it is
actually positive. These are all spells where inequality and per-capita income
change in the same direction, but the change in inequality is so large that it
more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of growth.
To uncover some empirical regularities in the data, table 2 reports a few
basic correlations. The coeﬃcients shown in the table are obtained from simple
OLS regressions and hence they are not necessarily indicative of the direction
of causality.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The coeﬃcients in columns I and II indicate that there is a positive associa-
tion between poverty reduction and growth and between poverty reduction and
redistribution. However, the lack of signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients in columns
III and IV suggests that: (i) the relationship between growth and poverty re-
duction is linear (i.e. the absolute value of the growth elasticity of poverty
4does not increase as the rate of growth increases) and (ii) the responsiveness of
poverty to growth is not necessarily aﬀected by the interaction between growth
and redistribution. The coeﬃcients in the last two columns indicate that there
is no trade-oﬀ between growth and redistribution. In fact, both the inequality
elasticity of growth and the growth elasticity of inequality are negative. This
is certainly good news given that both growth and redistribution seem to con-
tribute to poverty reduction.
3 Econometric model
Mathematically, a change in poverty is the combination of a change in aver-
age per-capita income and a change in the distribution of incomes around the
average. Following Bourguignon (2003)2, let z denote the poverty line drawn
at 1 dollar per-day and F(y) the cumulative distribution function of per-capita
income in a given country. The poverty headcount at time t is therefore deﬁned
as pt = Ft(z). The change in the poverty headcount between t and t+n is then
given by ∆p = Ft+1(z)−Ft(z). Let then G(·) denote the distribution of income
after normalizing for average income ym. Any change in F(·) is the algebirc
sum of (i) a change in G(·), holding ym constant and (ii) a change in ym that
leaves G(·) unchanged. The change in G(·) is the "distribution component" of
∆p and the change in ym is the "growth component".
The above decomposition suggests that economic policies aﬀect poverty via
their contribution to changes in ym (i.e. their contribution to economic growth)
and G(·) (i.e. their contribution to redistribution). In addition, economic poli-
cies might shape poverty dynamics by making poverty more or less responsive
to a given change in ym for any given change in G(·). The theoretical rationale
underlying this additional eﬀect draws on the work of Vinod et al. (2000) on
the quality of growth. The quality content of growth depends on the change
in the value of assets like human and social capital and on the stability the
growth process. For any given change in inequality, the decrease in poverty as-
sociated with a given rate of growth is likely to be higher the better the quality
of this growth. Therefore, to the extent that they are able to promote better
(or worse) quality of growth, economic policies will strengthen (or weaken) the
responsiveness of poverty to growth.3
All in all, the eﬀects of policies on poverty are transmitted via: (i) eco-
nomic growth, (ii) changes in inequality, and (iii) changes in the responsiveness
of poverty to growth. Accordingly, the econometric model consists of three
endogenous equations:
y_pcs = α0 + α1ginis + α2ph_$1s + A3Vs + A4Ws + εs (1)
2See also Datt and Ravaillon (1992), Kakwani (1993), and Kraay (2006)
3Section 5 shows that most of the eﬀect of policies on the responsiveness of poverty to
growth is explained by their eﬀect on the volatility of the growth process.
5ginis = β0 + β1y_pcs + β2ph_$1s + B3Vs + B4Zs + υs (2)
ph_$1s = γ0+γ1y_pcs+γ2ginis+γ3ginis∗y_pcs+C3(y_pcs∗Vs)+ωs (3)
where y_pc,gini,ph_$1 are the annualized percentage changes in per-capita
income, Gini index, and poverty headcount respectively, ε,υ,ω are the error
terms, and s indicates the generic spell in the dataset. V is a vector that in-
cludes the economic policy variables tyr,credit,trade,cpi,and gov (all expressed
in annualized percentage changes). W is a vector of controls that includes
the values of per-capita income and Gini coeﬃcient at the beginning of each
spell. Initial per-capita income (i_y_pc) is meant to account for conditional
convergence eﬀects while the initial value of the Gini index (i_Gini) captures
the eﬀect of given levels of inequality on subsequent growth dynamics. Z is a
vector that includes the initial value of the Gini index (i_gini) and the coun-
try ﬁxed eﬀects legor_fr,lat_bast,and ethnic. The logic underlying the in-
clusion of these country ﬁxed eﬀects draws on Carmignani (2009): they rep-
resent structural determinants of institutional quality that are important in
shaping the distribution of income over time. Finally, the parameters to be
estimated are α0,α1,α2,β0,β1,β2,γ0,γ1,γ2,γ3 plus the vector of coeﬃcients
A3,A4,B3,B4,and C3.
Two main features of the above speciﬁcation are worth a mention. First,
the system formalizes the three transmission channels of the eﬀect of policies on
poverty dynamics: A3 captures the eﬀect via growth, B3 the eﬀect via changes
in inequality, and C3 the eﬀect via the responsiveness of poverty to growth.
Note that in equation (3), y_pcs ∗ Vs is in fact a vector of interactive terms
between growth and the policy variables, so that the coeﬃcients C3 measure
the contribution of policy variables to the partial derivative of ph_$1 w.r.t.
y_pc. Because γ1 is going to be negative, a positive coeﬃcient on the interactive
term means that higher values of the policy variable reduce the responsiveness
of poverty to growth. A similar interpretation holds for the coeﬃcient on the
interactive term ginis ∗ y_pcs: if γ3 > 0, the an increase in inequality lowers
the responsiveness of poverty to growth. The second important feature of the
system is that it allows for endogenous relationships between growth, changes
in poverty, and changes in inequality as each of these three variables appears
on the r.h.s. of the regression of the other two variables. In other words,
the system incorporates the endogenous evolution of growth and changes in
inequality (slope coeﬃcients α1 and β1), the direct eﬀects of growth and changes
in inequality on poverty (slope coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2), and the feedback eﬀect
of poverty dynamics on growth and changes in inequality (slope coeﬃcients α2
and β2). The reason why this feedback eﬀect might be important is that the
poor are most likely to be socially excluded and economically marginalized from
the rest of the society. As a consequence, an increase in poverty is expected to
result in larger income inequalities and a smaller growth potential.
6The system is estimated using a GMM system estimator (Wooldridge, 2003).
The system estimator accounts for cross-correlations among the error terms of
the three equations. At the same time, the system estimator is not immune from
problems. In particular, if one of the three equations were misspeciﬁed, then the
estimates of all the equations would be negatively aﬀected. It is therefore wise to
use equation-by-equation estimates to test the robustness of system estimates.
The GMM system estimates will be then accompanied by a set of 2SLS estimates
of each equation taken separately from the others. These equation-by-equation
estimates are also useful to generate ﬁrst stage diagnostics on the validity of the
instruments chosen for the policy variables (see below).
A complication arising in the estimation of the system of equations (1), (2),
and (3) is that the changes in the economic policy variables are likely to be
endogenous to the dependent variables. For this reason, the economic policy
variables (and the interactive terms in equation (3)) have to be instrumented.
To this purpose, the time dimension of the dataset is exploited and lagged and
initial values of all the potentially endogenous variables are used as instruments.
In the case of interactive terms, the lagged and initial values are obtained from
the interaction of the lagged and initial values of the individual terms. Country
ﬁxed eﬀects and initial values of per-capita income and inequality are taken to
be pre-determined and hence they are instrumented by themselves. This choice
of instruments is then submitted to a battery of tests. To test the exogene-
ity of instruments, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is used. The
null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions implied by the choice of in-
struments are valid is never rejected at usual conﬁdence levels. The relevance
of instruments is assessed using ﬁrst stage diagnostics from the equation-by-
equation estimation. The standard partial R2 is in the range of 0.5 to 0.7 and
the p-value of the F-test of joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments is
always below 0.1. The Shea’s partial R2 is slightly lower than the standard
partial R2, but still in the range of 0.4 to 0.6. As discussed in Baum et al.
(2003 and 2007), these values indicate that the chosen instruments are indeed
relevant. All in all, the tests seem to suggest that the instruments are valid.4
4 Results
4.1 System estimates
System estimates are presented in Table 3. Column I reports the estimates of
the growth equation (1), column II the estimates of the inequality equation (2),
and column III the estimates of the poverty equation (3).
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
4The Sargan statistics and the associated p-values are reported at the bottom of the tables
in the next section. The ﬁrst stage diagnostics for each endogenous regressor can instead be
obtained from the author upon request.
7To start with, consider the endogenous relationship between growth, changes
in inequality, and changes in poverty. The negative coeﬃcient on y_pc and the
positive coeﬃcient on gini in column III imply that a combination of growth and
redistribution provides the most favorable scenario for poverty reduction. At the
same time, there is no evidence of a trade-oﬀ between growth and redistribution.
In fact, the negative coeﬃcients on gini in column I and on y_pc in column II
indicate that redistribution favors growth and vice-versa. Interestingly, however,
the lack of signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on the interactive term y_pc ∗ gini in
column III suggests that the change in inequality does not aﬀect the growth
elasticity of poverty. Finally, changes in poverty signiﬁcantly feed back onto
growth prospects and inequality dynamics. The signs of the coeﬃcients on
ph_$1 in columns I and II conﬁrm the simple intuition that an increase in the
poverty headcount reduces growth and increases inequality.
Turning to the eﬀect of policy variables, the evidence is that multiple chan-
nels operate at the same time. For government size and ﬁnancial intermediation
two eﬀects of opposite sign seem to be at work. On the one hand, both gov and
credit contribute to poverty reduction by strengthening growth (column I). On
the other hand, both variables also cause larger inequalities (column II). More-
over, the positive coeﬃcient on y_pc ∗ credit in column III implies that credit
deepening reduces the responsiveness of poverty to economic growth. Macro-
economic stability (here identiﬁed by negative - or marginally positive - changes
in the consumer price index) reduces poverty in two complementary ways: (i)
by strengthening growth and (ii) by increasing the growth elasticity of poverty.
Trade openness and education do not seem to produce any signiﬁcant growth or
redistribution eﬀect. However, they aﬀect poverty via their eﬀect on its elastic-
ity with respect to growth. More speciﬁcally, greater openness to trade makes
poverty less responsive to growth, while wider eduction increases responsiveness.
Some of the above ﬁndings deserve a more explicit interpretation. The
inequality-increasing eﬀect associated with gov indicates that broad govern-
ment expenditure is not well targeted to the poor. Hence, narrower and better
targeted spending programs are required to reduce inequalities in developing
countries. With respect to credit, one would probably expect deeper credit to
reduce inequalities. However, in most developing economies, the rich have pref-
erential access to credit. Therefore, an increase in the volume of credit might
well widen the distance between rich and poor. Finally, the coeﬃcients on the
interactive terms between growth and policies in equation (3) are consistent
with the view that policies make poverty more or less responsive to growth by
aﬀecting the quality of growth. Education is expected to improve the quality
of growth by increasing the value of human and social capital. On the con-
trary, trade openness, macroeconomic instability, and ﬁnancial deepening are
likely to reduce quality of growth by making growth itself more volatile (see (5).
The estimated coeﬃcients then conﬁrm that education makes growth more pro-
poor while openness, macroeconomic instability, and ﬁnancial deepening make
growth less pro-poor.
The last bits of evidence concern the role of the other control variables in the
growth equation (column I) and inequality equation (column II). In the growth
8equation, there is no evidence of conditional convergence. In fact, the positive
coeﬃcient on i_y_pc suggests that initially richer countries tend to grow faster.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the initial level of inequality (i_gini) is instead
negative, meaning that initially more unequal societies tend to experience slower
growth. Note however that these societies do not necessarily fall into a poverty
trap given that they can still undertake redistribution. Redistribution would
then allow them to strengthen growth and reduce poverty at the same time.
In the inequality equation, French legal origins and proximity to the equator
tend to make the distribution less equal. The interpretation of this ﬁnding
follows from la Porta et al. (1999). French legal origins and proximity to
the equator tend to generate worse institutions. Bad institutions then sharpen
income inequality (Carmignani, 2009). Finally, a higher initial inequality makes
redistribution more diﬃcult, possibly through some hysteresis eﬀect. Combined
with the evidence on the eﬀect of i_gini from the growth equation, this result
indicate that the progress in curbing inequalities and poverty might be initially
slower in countries characterized by a high Gini coeﬃcient. However, once initial
gains are made, the process will be self-fulﬁlling.
4.2 Single equation estimates and robustness checks
As discussed in Section (3), it is important to check whether results are sensitive
to the use of a system estimator vs. an equation-by-equation estimator. To this
purpose, two stages least squares estimates of the three equations are reported
in Table 4. The information in Table 4 is organized in the same way as in Table
3. The only addition is the R2 of each equation to have an idea of the goodness
of ﬁt. It is immediately clear that the main results obtained from the system
estimates are conﬁrmed. Most of the variables retain their sign and signiﬁcance.
Only two notable exceptions emerge, both in the inequality equation. First,
the feedback eﬀect of changes in poverty on changes in inequality is no longer
signiﬁcant at usual conﬁdence levels. Second, education now plays a perverse
role as it increases inequalities.5 Because the sign on the interactive term y_pc∗
tyr is still negative and signiﬁcant, one can argue that wider education reduces
absolute poverty while increasing relative poverty. In other words, an increase
in average years of schooling makes both the rich and poor better oﬀ, but the
income opportunities of the rich increase proportionally more than the income
opportunities of the poor.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
To test the robustness of the system estimates, the following sensitivity
checks are also conducted.6 First, the interactive term y_pc ∗ i_gini is added
to the speciﬁcation of the poverty equation. The rationale for including this
interactive term follows from the mathematical decomposition of changes in
5This result is not new in the literature, see for instance Carmignani (2009).
6These additional estimates are not reported as they do not imply any qualitative change
in the main result of the paper. Nevertheless, they are available from the author upon request.
9the poverty rate, when the assumption is made that the distribution of income
is log-normal (see Bourguignon, 2003). The coeﬃcient of this new interactive
term is expected to be positive, meaning that the growth elasticity of poverty
is lower the more unequal income distribution initially is. It turns out that
y_pc ∗ i_gini is largely insigniﬁcant. All of the other coeﬃcients of the sys-
tem are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 3. Second, the initial
level of per-capita income i_y_pc is added to the inequality equation. Again,
the estimated coeﬃcient is largely insigniﬁcant, while nothing else in the sys-
tem changes. To allow for possible non-linearities, a speciﬁcation including both
i_y_pc and (i_y_pc)2 is also estimated, but neither of the two terms appear to
be statistically signiﬁcant. Third, the country ﬁxed eﬀect legor_fr, lat_abst,
and ethnic are added to the speciﬁcation of the growth equation. Neither of
the three is statistically signiﬁcant. At the same time, i_y_pc and i_gini in
the same equation become insigniﬁcant. This might be a symptom of multi-
collinearity, as the three country ﬁxed eﬀects might actually determine income
and inequality levels via their eﬀect on institutional quality. When i_y_pc and
i_gini are removed from the growth equation, then both legor_fr and ethnic
display a statistically signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient. Again, this result can be
interpreted as evidence of the adverse eﬀect of bad institutions on growth.7
Finally, to maximize the number of observations in the sample, the variable
tyr and the associated interactive term y_pc∗tyr are dropped from the system.
As a matter of fact, tyr is not available for all 151 spells of the original dataset,
and that is why the number of observations per equation is only 90. When
dropping tyr it is possible to estimate the system on 120 observations per equa-
tion, for a total of 360 system observations. Relative to the estimates in table
3, estimated coeﬃcients retain their sign, but occasional changes in their level
of statistical signiﬁcance are observed. The eﬀect of government expenditure on
growth and inequality is no longer signiﬁcant. However, gov_cons now aﬀects
poverty by reducing its responsiveness to growth. The eﬀects of credit deepen-
ing on inequality and responsiveness also become statistically insigniﬁcant, so
that in the end credit only aﬀects poverty via a positive growth-eﬀect. Finally,
the eﬀect of macroeconomic stability on the responsiveness of poverty becomes
insigniﬁcant, while its eﬀect on growth remains positive and signiﬁcant.8
7Ideally, one would like to add a direct measure of institutional quality to the system. To
construct a proxy that matches the irregular frequency and length of the spells in this dataset,
annual data on institutions would be needed over the period 1980-2005 for all (or most of)
the developing countries in the sample. However, this type of data is hardly available. An
interesting possibility that will deserve attention in future work is to use "contract intensive
money" (Clague et al. 1999) to proxy for institutional quality. Being constructed from widely
available money aggregate data, contract intensive money can be computed over spells of
irregular frequency and length.
8The system without tyr and tyr∗y_pc is also re-estimated on a sub-sample that excludes
transition economies to make sure that results (particularly those concerning the endogenous
relationship between growth and redistribution) are not driven by the dynamics of the trans-
formation from plan to market. No major changes relative to the estimates in Table 2 are
observed.
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The previous section oﬀers some intriguing evidence on the role of ﬁnancial
intermediation. The positive coeﬃcient on credit in equation (1) means that
ﬁnancial deepening strengthens growth, and this is indeed a rather common re-
sult in the growth literature. However, the positive coeﬃcient on the interactive
term credit ∗ y_pc in equation (3) means that ﬁnancial deepening also makes
poverty less responsive to growth. How could this latter ﬁnding be explained?
This section puts forward the following explanation: (i) more volatile growth
tends to be less pro-poor and (ii) ﬁnancial deepening increases growth volatility.
It will turn out that the volatility channel also explains why trade openness and
inﬂation make poverty less responsive to growth.
Intuitively, volatility hurts the poor more than the rich as the poor generally
have less means to cope with the adverse consequences of sharp cyclical ﬂuctu-
ations. For instance, the poor might have very limited access to consumption
smoothing technologies or their jobs might be less secure in a cyclical downturn.
It then follows that higher volatility makes poverty less elastic with respect to
growth. An empirical test of this conjecture can be simply performed by adding
the interaction between growth and volatility to the standard model in column
II of Table 2. Letting vol denote the standard deviation of the annual growth
rate over each spell, then the estimated coeﬃcients in the extended standard
model are as follows (p-values in brackets):
ph_$1 = 1.210
(0.46)
+ −2.767 ∗ y_pc
(0.000)
+ 2.414 ∗ gini
(0.000)
+ 0.225 ∗ (y_pc ∗ vol)
(0.037)
(4)
The positive coeﬃcient on the interactive term y_pc∗vol implies that higher
values of vol reduce the marginal eﬀect of y_pc on ph_$1. The inclusion of vol
not interacted with growth does not change the results (and vol alone turns out
to be largely insigniﬁcant). There is thus evidence that more volatile growth
tends to be less pro-poor. The implication is that economic policy variables
that increase volatility will also reduce the growth elasticity of poverty.
The question is then whether or not ﬁnancial deepening is positively associ-
ated with growth volatility. In fact, a more developed ﬁnancial system should
allow for better consumption smoothing, even though this does not necessarily
mean that output ﬂuctuations will also be smoother. Moreover, if the expan-
sion of credit occurs in waves, then boom-bust cycles would generate both higher
average growth and higher growth volatility. A volatility equation is then esti-
mated and the results are as follows:
vol = 2.427
(0.000)
+ 0.023 ∗ credit
(0.000)
+ 0.043 ∗ cpi
(0.000)
+ 0.031 ∗ trade
(0.016)
(5)
In addition to credit, the equation includes two other policy variables that
are likely to aﬀect volatility. The positive coeﬃcient on cpi indicates that there is
a positive association between macroeconomic instability and output volatility.
The positive coeﬃcient on trade instead suggests that more open economies are
11probably more exposed to external shocks. The eﬀect of credit on volatility is
also positive, in line with the credit-cycles argument.9
Taken together, equations (4) and (5) tell an interesting story: higher inﬂa-
tion, greater trade openness, and credit deepening make growth less pro-poor
because they tend to increase the volatility of growth. Thus, the volatility
channel explains the positive estimated coeﬃcients on the interactive terms
y_pc ∗ cpi,y_pc ∗ credit,y_pc ∗ trade reported in Tables 3 and 4. Also note
that the lack of signiﬁcance of gov_cons in the volatility equation (see 5) might
explain why the interactive term y_pc∗gov is not statistically signiﬁcant in the
system estimates. Finally, growth volatility does not seem to be the relevant
channel to explain the eﬀect of education on the responsiveness of poverty to
growth. As discussed above, this eﬀect is in fact better understood in terms of
redistribution of opportunities and value human capital.
6 Policy analysis and conclusions
The paper employs a system of three endogenous equations to study the de-
terminants of absolute poverty dynamics. A key feature of the system is that
it allows economic policy variables to aﬀect poverty via separate eﬀects on (i)
the rate of economic growth, (ii) the change in income inequality, and (iii) the
responsiveness of poverty to any given rate of growth. The system also incorpo-
rates a feedback eﬀect of poverty dynamics on growth and inequality. The main
results can be summarized as follows. First, the elasticity of poverty is negative
with respect to growth and positive with respect to changes in income inequality,
meaning that a combination of growth and redistribution represents the most
favorable scenario for poverty reduction. Importantly, there is no evidence of
a trade-oﬀ between growth and redistribution. If anything, the two processes
appear to reinforce each other. However, the growth elasticity of poverty is
not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by changes in inequality. Second, the feedback eﬀect
of poverty on growth and inequality is signiﬁcant: an increase in poverty slows
growth down and sharpens income inequalities. Third, economic policy variables
aﬀect poverty in diﬀerent ways through diﬀerent channels. Higher government
expenditure and deeper level of ﬁnancial intermediation generate two eﬀects of
opposite sign: they strengthen growth, thus reducing poverty, but they also
sharpen inequality. Macroeconomic stability also determines a positive growth
eﬀect, without however causing any adverse eﬀect on inequality. Economic pol-
icy variables have also signiﬁcant eﬀects on the extent to which any given rate of
growth is more or less pro-poor. Greater openness to international trade, higher
inﬂation, and deeper ﬁnancial intermediation tend to increase the volatility of
output growth and in this way the contribute to making poverty less elastic
9The equation is estimated by two stages least squares. The Hausman test indicates that
cpi is potentially endogenous and therefore it is instrumented by its lagged and initial values.
When added to the volatility equation, both gov and edu turn out to be largely insigniﬁcant.
The inclusion of the level of per-capita GDP does not qualitatively change the estimated
coeﬃcients on credit,trade, and cpi.
12with respect to growth. On the contrary, wider education increases the value
of human capital in the economy, improves income opportunities, and therefore
makes poverty more responsive to growth.
From a policymaking perspective, the empirical results highlight the impor-
tance of choosing the appropriate policy mix to ﬁght poverty. The endogenous
links between growth, redistribution, and poverty reduction imply that there
exist two possible equilibria to which countries can converge. In the virtuous
equilibrium, a country achieves a scenario of fast growth and redistribution.
These two processes strengthen each other and reduce poverty. In turn, lower
poverty improves growth prospects and reduces inequalities. In the vicious equi-
librium, the country is unable to achieve the growth and redistribution scenario
and hence poverty is not signiﬁcantly reduced. Persistently high poverty in turn
depresses growth and causes large inequalities, thus making the achievement of
the favorable scenario even less likely. The policy mix then plays a critical role
in determining which of the two equilibria the country converges to. The evi-
dence discussed in the previous sections provides some indications on how the
ideal policy mix (that is, the policy mix leading to the virtuous cycle) ought to
be designed:
• Low and stable inﬂation should be set as a priority in the macroeco-
nomic policy framework of developing countries. However, the framework
should also be ﬂexible enough to provide policymakers with the policy
space required to take a truly counter-cyclical policy stance. In fact, a
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy would reduce the volatility of out-
put growth, thus contributing to making poverty more elastic with respect
to growth. In this respect, low inﬂation should be established as a medium-
term target, thus allowing actual inﬂation to overshoot (or undershoot) the
target in the short term to respond to cyclical shocks. A counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policy that reduces volatility will also maximize the con-
tributions of domestic ﬁnancial development and trade liberalization to
poverty reduction.
• Government size should not be reduced as it can be an important driver
of growth. However, the scope of the government must be adjusted in
view of the need to promote the redistribution of incomes. Government
consumption must be therefore better targeted towards the poor. In this
sense, subsidies and transfers appear to be rather eﬀective in lowering the
Gini coeﬃcient (see for instance Carmignani, 2009). Therefore, budgetary
allocations to these categories of public expenditure should be increased.
• The public supply of education services should be increased as wider ed-
ucation makes growth more pro-poor. The government should make sure
that the delivery of education translates into an eﬀective improvement of
opportunities for the poor. This in turn calls for greater focus on "quality"
issues, such as the update of curricula, the formation of teachers in rural
areas, and the supply of teaching and study material.
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14Appendix
Variables description
Unless otherwise indicated, all of the variables are expressed in annualized
percentage changes. WDI is the World Development Indicators Database of the
World Bank, 2008 issue.
• ph_$1, poverty headcount: Proportion of population living on less than
1 dollar per day. Source: PovcalNet, World Bank.
• y_pc, per-capita income: real per-capita GDP at constant US dollars
(base year 2000). Source: WDI.
• gini, Gini coeﬃcient of inequality of income distribution. Source: Povcal-
Net, World Bank.
• gov, government size: total government expenditure in percent of GDP.
Source: WDI.
• credit, ﬁnancial depth: domestic credit to the private sector in percent of
GDP. Source: WDI.
• trade, international trade openness: exports plus imports in percent of
GDP. Source: WDI.
• cpi, consumer price index. Source: WDI.
• edu, education: number of years of schooling of the average individual in
the population. Source: Barro and Lee (2004) and UNESCO.
• legor_fr, French legal origin: dummy variable taking value 1 if country’s
legal system originates from the French civil code. Source: La Porta et al.
(1999). This variable is expressed in levels.
• ethnix, ethnic fragmentation: probability that two randomly selected in-
dividuals are not from the same ethnic group. Source: La Porta et al.
(1999). This variable is expressed in levels.
• lat_abst, distance from equator. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). This
variable is expressed in levels.
• vol, growth volatility: standard deviation of y_pc over a given spell.
Source: WDI
• i_y_pc, real per-capita GDP at the beginning of a given spell. Source:
WDI. This variable is expressed in log-levels.
• i_gini,Gini coeﬃcient at the beginning of a given spell. Source: WDI.
This variable is expressed in log-levels.
15List of countries and spells in the dataset
Albania 97_02 Costa Rica 81_86 Indoneisa 87_93 Mexico 89_95 Slovenia 87_93
Algeria 88_95 Costa Rica 86_93 Indonesia 93_98 Mexico 95_00 Slovenia 93_98
Argentina 86_92 Costa Rica 93_98 Iran 86_94 Moldova 92_97 South Africa 93_00
Argetnina 92_98 Cote d’Ivoire 85_93 Jamaica 88_93 Moldova 97_02 Sri Lanka 85_90
Argentina 98_03 Cote d’Ivoire 93_98 Jamaica 93_99 Mongolia 95_02 Sri Lanka 90_96
Armenia 96_01 Crotia 88_98 Jordan 92_97 Morocco 85_91 Sri Lanka 96_02
Azerbaijan 95_01 Czech Rep. 88_93 Jordan 97_03 Morocco 91_99 Tanzania 91_01
Bangladesh 84_89 Dominc. Rep. 86_92 Kazakhstan 88_93 Nepal 85_96 Thailand 81_88
Bangladesh 89_96 Dominic. Rep. 92_00 Kazakhstan 93_01 Nepal 96_04 Thailand 88_96
Belarus 88_93 Ecuador 87_94 Kenua 92_97 Nicaragua 93_98 Thailand 96_02
Belarus 93_98 Egypt 91_00 Kyrgyz Rep. 93_98 Nigeria 86_93 Tunisia 85_90
Bolivia 91_97 El Salvador 89_95 Kyrgyz Rep. 98_03 Nigeria 93_03 Tunisia 90_95
Bolivia 97_02 El Salvador 95_00 Lao 92_97 Pakistan 87_93 Tunisia 95_00
Botswana 86_94 Estonia 88_93 Lao 97_02 Pakistan 93_99 Turkey 87_94
Brazil 81_87 Estonia 93_98 Latvia 88_93 Panama 89_95 Turkey 94_00
Brazil 87_92 Estonia 98_03 Latvia 98_03 Panama 95_00 Turkmenistan 93_98
Brazil 92_97 Ethiopia 82_95 Lesotho 87_93 Paraguay 90_95 Uganda 89_96
Brazil 97_02 Ethiopia 95_00 Lithuania 93_98 Paraguay 95_02 Uganda 96_02
Bulgaria 88_93 Gambia 92_98 Lithuania 98_03 Peru 86_94 Ukraine 88_95
Bulgaria 93_98 Georgia 96_01 Macedonia 98_03 Peru 94_00 Ukraine 95_02
Bulgaria 98_03 Ghana 88_98 Madagascar 80_93 Philippines 85_91 Uruguay 81_89
Burundi 92_98 Guatemala 87_98 Madagascar 93_99 Philippines 91_97 Uruguay 89_96
Cameroon 96_01 Guyana 93_98 Malawi 98_04 Poland 89_96 Uzbekistan 93_98
Chile 87_92 Honduras 86_92 Malaysia 84_89 Poland 96_02 Venezuela 81_87
Chile 92_98 Honduras 92_98 Malaysia 89_95 Romania 89_94 Venezuela 87_93
China 87_93 Honduras 98_03 Mali 89_94 Romania 94_00 Venezuela 93_98
China 93_99 Hungary 87_93 Mali 94_01 Russia 94_00 Vietnam 93_98
Colombia 81_88 Hungary 93_98 Mauritania 87_03 Rwanda 85_00 Yemen 92_98
Colombia 88_95 India 87_93 Mauritania 93_00 Senegal 91_01 Zambia 91_96
Colombia 95_00 India 93_00 Mexico 84_89 Slovak Rep. 88_96 Zambia 96_03
Zimbabwe 90_95
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Mean -1.24 1.32 -1.96
Median -2.26 1.49 -0.94
Maximum 59.51 8.28 56.35
Minimum -50.11 -11.39 -66.44
Standard deviation 19.04 3.33 13.80
Sample with gini < 0
Mean -6.99 1.72 -2.08
Median -5.63 1.52 -1.67
Maximum 51.30 7.68 43.25
Minimum -50.11 -3.01 -28.04
Standard deviation 14.85 2.55 9.70
Notes: The sample includes 151 spells covering 83 countries (see list in the Appendix).
The variables are expressed as annualized percentage change over each spell.
19Table 2: Correlations between poverty, growth, and elasticity






y_pc -1.879*** -1.415*** 0.089 .. -0.203***
gini .. 2.29*** -0.142 -0.116 -0.277*** ..
Notes: The coeﬃcients are obtained from an OLS regression of each dependent
variable on the listed regressors. The constant term is always included, but not re-
ported in the table *, **, ***denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
conﬁdence level respectively.
20Table 3: System estimates
I II III
y_pc gini ph_$1
const 13.518*** 20.128*** -0.403
y_pc .. -0.322*** -3.307***
gini -0.450*** .. 0.801**
ph_$1 -0.048*** 0.018* ..
gov 0.088*** 0.160*** ..
cpi -0.029*** -0.005 ..
trade 0.019 0.017 ..
credit 0.119*** 0.044* ..
tyr -0.013 0.012 ..
i_y_pc 0.352*** .. ..
i_gini -3.720*** -5.130*** ..
legor_fr .. 0.823*** ..
lat_abst .. -1.184** ..
ethnic .. -0.546 ..
y_pc ∗ gov .. .. 0.119
y_pc ∗ cpi .. .. 0.057**
y_pc ∗ trade .. .. 0.458***
y_pc ∗ credit .. .. 0.191***
y_pc ∗ tyr .. .. -0.568***
y_pc ∗ gini .. .. -0.151
Observations 270
Sargan test 50.49 (44 d.f.)
p_value 0.232
Notes: GMM system estimates of equations 123. i_y_pc, i_gini, legor_fr,lat_abst,
and ethnic are exogenous. The set of instruments includes the exogenous variables
plus lagged and initial values of all the other endogenous regressors. *, **, ***denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% conﬁdence level respectively.
21Table 4: Single equation estimates
I II III
y_pc gini ph_$1
const 19.218*** 18.823*** 0.164
y_pc .. -0.187*** -3.685***
gini -0.607*** .. 0.808**
ph_$1 -0.041*** 0.014 ..
gov 0.088*** 0.111*** ..
cpi -0.042*** -0.011 ..
trade -0.023 -0.004 ..
credit 0.129*** 0.008*** ..
tyr 0.030 0.071** ..
i_y_pc 0.353*** .. ..
i_gini -5.174*** -4.824*** ..
legor_fr .. 0.826*** ..
lat_abst .. -1.604** ..
ethnic .. -0.726 ..
y_pc ∗ gov .. .. 0.144
y_pc ∗ cpi .. .. 0.057**
y_pc ∗ trade .. .. 0.453***
y_pc ∗ credit .. .. 0.196***
y_pc ∗ tyr .. .. -0.460***
y_pc ∗ gini .. .. 0.014
Observations 90 90 90
Sargan test 15.98 13.29 20.29
p_value 0.383 0.425 0.207
R2 0.692 0.835 0.524
Notes: 2SLS system estimates of equations 123. i_y_pc, i_gini, legor_fr,lat_abst,
and ethnic are exogenous. The set of instruments includes the exogenous variables
plus lagged and initial values of all the other endogenous regressors. *, **, ***denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% conﬁdence level respectively.
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